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I. introduction
The present study deals with the relationship between 
modernization and human needs. More specifically, 
the main theory is that, as technology advances and 
society becomes more modern, the greater satisfac­
tion of physiological needs is accompanied by 
increasing emphasis on sociopsychological ones.
To test this theory, the author presents two types 
of data. First, a brief historical account of social 
welfare policies covers mental health conceptions 
and needs, family service agencies, definitions of, 
and reactions to, poverty, and the like. Second, a more 
circumscribed empirical investigation ascertains the 
nature of the work of various social agencies concern­
ed with family needs in more recent times.
II. the nature of human needs
There is still much confusion regarding the scien­
tific terms, descriptions, typologies, and theories 
of man’s multitudinous needs (Vernon, 1972:139). 
Sillamy (1967:44), for instance, has simply referred 
to a need as an «état d’un individu par rapport à ce 
qui lui est necessaire.» Murray (1938:123-124), 
on the other hand, has formulated one of the most 
technical definitions of need, that is, a construct re­
presenting a force «in the brain region, a force which 
organizes perception, apperception, intellection, co­
nation and action in such a way as to transform 
in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying sit­
uation. A need is sometimes provoked directly 
by internal processes of a certain kind (viscerogenic, 
endocrinogenic, thalamicogenic) arising in the course 
of vital sequences, but, more frequently (when in a 
state of readiness) by the occurrence of one of a few 
commonly effective press.... Each need is character­
istically accompanied by a particular feeling or emo­
tion and tends to use certain modes... to further its 
trend.»
Moreover, although many psychologists and others 
have employed the terms need and drive synonymous­
ly, the two have also been distinguished from each 
other. Indeed, unlike a drive, a concept borrowed 
from physics by Robert Woodworth (1918), a need 
«implies a more channeled impulse with a more artic­
ulated goal» (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 
272).
The countless and complex typologies of needs may 
be simplified and summarized as follows:
1. A basic or primary need is «one from which 
other needs are derived» or an innate need «deter­
mined by genetic factors» (English and English, 1965:
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339). Erich Fromm’s (1955: Chapter 3) famous clas­
sification of basic human needs is relatedness, tran­
scendence, rootedness, identity, and a frame of orien­
tation.
2. An internal need is that which «arises from 
changes within the organism, relatively independent­
ly of direct external stimulation» (English and En­
glish, 1965:339).
3. External needs refer to «the lack of some object 
or condition in the environment that would, if pre­
sent, promote the biological or psychological efficien­
cy of the organism» (English and English, 1965:339).
4. The goal of the so-called stimulus needs is not 
survival but «some kind of stimulation and partic­
ularly change in stimulation». Thus, these are of 
two subtypes, namely, a need for sensory stimulation 
and a need for stimulus variability (Kagan and Have- 
mann, 1972: 339-344).
5. Physiological needs or drives «are regarded as 
persisting, organic motivations: conditions that a- 
rouse, sustain, and regulate human and animal behav­
ior. Insofar as drives are based upon metabolic 
conditions they are common to all men in all socie­
ties and to many animals» (Young, 1968:275). These 
refer to survival and involve oxygen, water, proteins, 
vitamins, and the like.
When the physiological needs are satisfied, the 
organism is said to be in homeostasis, a term coined 
by Walter Cannon (Berkowitz, 1969:108-109). In 
addition, such primary drive reduction may be as­
sociated with related responses which are gradually re­
inforced and thus lead to the development of acquired 
secondary drives (Hull, 1943). Curt Richter (1943) 
has expanded the concept of homeostasis to include 
indirect physiological behavior that compensates for 
frustrated direct physiological processes (cf. O’ 
Kelly, 1963). Some authors have gone even further 
than that, thus permitting homeostasis to encompass 
behavior aimed at maintaining social order and har­
mony.
6. Sociopsychological needs (for creativity, love, 
power, status, and the like), from Plato’s Republic 
and Laws to Edward Thorndike’s «law of effect» 
and David McClelland’s measure of Murray’s n Ach 
(McClelland et al., 1953), have been subjected to much 
speculation and myriads of experiments. This partly 
explains the great number of «synonyms» employed 
with reference to such needs, namely, secondary mo­
tives or needs, derived needs, social needs, socio­
genic needs, acquirable or learnable drives, acquired 
drives, and psychogenic drives or needs. According 
to Brown (1968:280), a need of this kind is one «that 
is a product of learning. In principle, animals as 
well as man can acquire drives, but man’s opportu­
nities for such learning during the process of social­
ization are held to be far more numerous, and the
complexity and diversity of his activities are thought 
more urgently to demand an acquired-drive inter­
pretation.» Other authors have referred to such a 
need as one «learned by the individual through social 
interaction» (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 
272), or «a need growing out of the operation of pri­
mary needs but constituting a distinct motive in 
its own right» (English and English, 1965:339).
III. history of mental health
Even a brief account of the history of man’s atti­
tudes toward and description of mental illness and 
health will easily afford some insight into the sub­
ject under consideration, that is, changing human 
needs in changing civilizations.
What seems to be the first description of a manic- 
depressive psychosis deals with Saul, the first king 
of Israel (1020-1000 B.C.), whose fluctuating emotions 
shortened his reign when the Philistines exploited 
his instability by attacking and defeating him at Mount 
Gilboa: «Therefore Saul took a sword, and fell upon 
it» (I Samuel 31:4). His suicide, as a form of behavior 
generated by mental illness, differed only in degree 
from his jealous treatment of David and even his 
own beloved son Jonathan, as well as his ruthless con­
demnation of witches and subsequent necromantic 
dealings with the witch of Endor (I Samuel 28:7-20). 
The biblical descriptions of his manic and depressive 
states are revealing: «Saul said, Let us go down after 
the Philistines by night, and spoil them until the morn­
ing light, and let us not leave a man of them» (I 
Samuel 14:36); and «it came to pass, when the evil 
spirit from God was upon Saul, and David took an 
harp, and played with his hand» (I Samuel 16:23). 
It is no wonder, then, that such heights of bound­
less enthusiasm and depths of incapacitating depres­
sion inspired Browning’s poem, Handel’s oratorio, 
and Rembrandt’s portrait.
Five centuries later, Hippocrates of Cos (460-377 
B.C.), the so-called father of medicine, developed a 
naturalistic theory of mental illness. Indeed, in his 
The Sacred Disease, which deals with epilepsy, he 
attacks all demonic etiology and, instead, speaks of 
neurohumoral causes: «In my opinion, those who first 
attributed a sacred cause to this illness were like 
today’s magicians, purifiers, and mountebanks» 
(II, 1-4).
Plato (427-347 B.C.) mentioned three causes of 
mental illness, that is, somatic, sociocultural, and 
supernatural (Laws, 934a-e; Phaedrus, 245b-c; Re­
public, 573a-d).
Galen of Pergamum (129-199 A.D.), the court phy­
sician of Marcus Aurelius, often viewed brain disor­
ders as the main causes of mental illness.
It is surprising, then, that as late as the 16th cen­
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tury, especially in Germany, even scholars dealt with 
the etiology of mental illness as if the only diagnostic 
method were: «Cherchez le diable.» But now, a mod­
ern trend begins to reflect and influence the emer­
gence of a new emphasis on man’s sociopsychologi- 
cal needs. Johannes Weyer (1518-1588), for instance, 
the Protestant physician to Duke William of Cleves 
and so-called «first psychiatrist,» published his cel­
ebrated De Praestigiis Daemonum, in 1563, and De 
Lamiis, in 1577. Weyer, although he believed in the 
existence of Satan, attacked most vigorously the 
witchcraft theory of mental aberrations and asserted 
that the physician, not the priest, must treat such 
problems.
In the New World, in early Colonial times, this 
trend manifested itself in communal efforts to deal 
with physiological and sociopsychological needs less 
supernaturalistically and more realistically and ob­
jectively (Deutsch, 1949:47-48; Friedlander, 1961: 
78-79; Greenblatt, 1957).
Thus, in 1729, after a smallpox epidemic, the Ursu- 
line Sisters founded an orphanage for the survivors 
in New Orleans.
More revolutionary was the famous Pennsylvania 
Hospital, which Benjamin Franklin supported in 
1750 with his brilliant statement concerning the def­
inition of a specific cause of dependency and the 
specialized services which should be offered. This 
original philosophy included a central agency, compe­
tent physicians, the newest medical methods, and the 
conviction that the patients should be returned to 
their homes and work as soon as possible, which, as 
Franklin averred, would benefit both the poor and 
the taxpayers. It is further significant that this plan 
also stressed continuous medical research in this 
area. It is not surprising that, with Franklin behind 
this system, many cities became eager imitators.
The first publicly financed hospital for the mentally 
ill in the Colonies was authorized by the Virginia 
legislature in 1769.
Among the many later forces that influenced the 
definition and treatment of mental illness were Ri­
chard von Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis 
(1965), which appeared in 1886 and stressed disorders 
of the central nervous system, and Sigmund Freud’s 
(1856-1939) theory of psychoanalysis (Brill, 1938).
In the United States, an important step was taken 
in 1946, when the National Mental Health Act was 
passed. This act, which defined mental illness as a 
major social problem, was partly inspired by Albert 
Deutsch’s work. Three years later, Deutsch published 
his The Mentally III in America, which influenced 
both the public and legislators, and ultimately led to 
the development of the National Institute of Mental 
Health.
Among the additional measures that were adopted
to support mental health programs after the Nation­
al Mental Health Act of 1946 were the following:
1. Mental Health Study Act of 1955.
2. Maternal and Child Health and Mental Retar­
dation Planning Amendments to the Social Security 
Act (1963).
3. Mental Retardation Facilities and Community 
Mental Health Centers Construction Act (1963).
4. Mental Retardation Facilities and Community 
Mental Health Centers Construction Amendments 
(1965).
5. The Mental Health Amendments of 1967.
The National Institute of Mental Health itself has
introduced various innovations to improve therapy, 
including the Hospital Improvement Program and 
the Hospital Staff Development Program. For the 
mental health personnel’s training alone, the insti­
tute has expended the following sums of money:
Year Millions of Dollars
1948 1.1
1950 3.1
1952 4.2
1955 4.6
1960 22.9
1965 73.2
1969 109.0
At the present time, some of the most important 
scientific models dealing With mental health are as 
follows (Margolis and Favazza, 1971:775-780):
1. Medical model.
2. Sociocultural development model.
3. Behavioral model.
4. Psychodynamic model.
5. Community psychiatry-public health-community 
mental health model.
6. General systems model.
In brief, it seems that, as science and technology ad­
vance and our physiological needs reach higher lev­
els of satisfaction, we tend to become more aware 
of our sociopsychological needs, thus emphasizing 
their increasingly scientific definition, description, 
and etiology, and also expending more funds for the 
professional training of mental health specialists, as 
well as for the greater satisfaction of such nonphys­
ical needs (Holden, 1972). Moreover, the public it­
self appears to regard this form of satisfaction as 
an inalienable right.
IV. family service agencies
This trend can be seen more clearly in the recent 
development of social agencies concerned with fami­
ly needs.
Indeed, the Charity Organization Societies of the 
late 19th century, which were similar to various
96
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English organizations, emphasized relief and charity 
for the poor, since private efforts in this sphere were 
inadequate.
In 1911, however, the Charity Organization Socie­
ties formed the National Association of Societies 
for Organizing Charity, which included 62 societies. 
The new philosophy stressed nutrition, health, wel­
fare, the money payment principle, helping the in­
dividual to help himself, education, family counseling 
by volunteers known as «friendly visitors,» social 
reforms, and prevention.
Eight years later, the association changed its name 
to American Association for Organizing Family 
Social Work, thus expressing the gradual shift from 
community organization to family services (Fink, 
1942).
About 1920, as Mary Richard’s Social Diagnosis 
had already indicated in 1917, increasing emphasis 
was placed on the worth and dignity of the individ­
ual and on his sociopsychological needs. But this 
emphasiswas rather limited, and it diminished further 
when the depression years brought unemployment and 
intensified the physiological needs of the masses 
(Booz, 1967).
Then, in 1935, the Social Security Act introduced 
the concept of governmental responsibility for the 
basic needs of the family.
The Barden-La Follette Act of 1943 dealt with vo­
cational rehabilitation, stressing both physical and 
sociopsychological aspects.
Finally, after World War II, the new prosperity, 
the higher standard of living, the rising life span, 
and the expansion of the middle classes encouraged 
greater concern for man’s sociopsychological needs 
(Family Service Association of America, 1968; 
Brooks, 1972:387).
Once more, then, this brief history of family service 
agencies reveals the inverse relationship between 
physiological and sociopsychological human needs.
V. poverty
This relationship may be further explored by ex­
amining poverty, which is usually accompanied by a 
limited satisfaction of physiological needs.
In the United States, the percent distribution of 
families for high and low income levels was as fol­
lows between 1947 and 1969 (United States Bureau, 
of the Census, 1971:316):
Year Under $1,000 $15,000 and over
1947 10.8 2.7
1950 11.5 3.3
1955 7.7 1.4
1960 5.0 3.7
1965 2.9 7.6
1968 1.8 14.7
1969 1.6 19.2
One may also employ the poverty index method, 
the common form of which is that developed by Mol­
ile Orshansky (1965). This index is equal to the food 
budget times 3. Thus, in 1969, for an average nonfarm 
family consisting of four members, the minimum in­
come was fixed at $3,743 per year, or $2.56 per 
person, per diem. Of course, the corresponding po­
verty index for the farm family was 15 percent 
lower, since this type of family grew much of its own 
food. The poverty indices for various family sizes 
were as follows:
Family Members Poverty Indices
1 1,840
2 2,383
3 2,924
4 3,743
5 4,415
6 4,958
7 or more 6,101
This means that about 24,000,000 persons were 
«poor» in 1969 (President’s Commission on Income 
Maintenance, 1969). This technique also reveals that 
during «the 1960s the number of poor persons de­
creased sharply: from 1960 through 1969, the number 
of persons in poverty dropped from 40 million to 24 
million» (Harris and Townsend, 1971:898).
Such decrease should be accompanied by greater 
emphasis on sociopsychological needs in the Ameri­
can society.
VI. rising sociopsychological needs
Indeed, studies in gerontology, social work, and 
other areas indicate that such emphasis has been 
intensifying for several decades (Riley and Foner, 
1968:275-287; Konopka, 1963:4). According to Ha­
milton (1964:91), the «common stock of casework 
has come to include not only understanding economic 
social need, but the person who has the need. Both 
psychiatry and economics have taught indispensable 
principles of self-awareness and democratic values 
in 'relief’ administration, as in other forms of case­
work.» Moreover, the social case method «individua­
lizes the person... motivates independence, self- 
help, self-awareness, and responsibility in the client» 
and even considers his «emotional needs» (Hamil­
ton, 1964:245-246). One’s eligibility for public assis­
tance has also increasingly incorporated sociopsy­
chological considerations. The following quotations 
from Hamilton (1964:198-212) are relevant: «psy- 
chogenetic diagnosis» «to gain understanding of the 
growth of the personality»; about 1930, when the 
«stark realities of unemployment and destitution» 
prevailed, a «reaction against full developmental histo­
ries set in» even among professional social workers;
97
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 01:55:53 |
Έτιιθεώρησις Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών a και β' τρίμηνον 1974
security «in one’s culture is an essential part of self­
acceptance. Because each individual uses his culture 
in terms of his psychological needs it is important 
to be sensitive to caste and class»; and today «there 
is reemphasis upon appropriate psychogenetic his­
tory as there is support for a well-directed psy­
chosocial study.» More significantly, even when the 
form of public assistance is economic aid directed 
at physiological needs, the new approach in our 
affluent society stresses unrestricted money payments, 
personal dignity, sociopsychological counseling, and 
«support of the ego philosophically and technical­
ly,» namely, an effort to diminish the social stigma 
that accompanies public relief (Hamilton, 1964:87- 
88).
It is interesting to add that the now prosperous 
working classes have finally become keenly aware of 
nonphysical needs and even demanded that these 
needs be met as extensively as possible. In 1965, for 
instance, it was stated, with reference to the United 
Auto Workers, that collective «bargaining is making 
the psychiatrist’s couch available to persons with 
mental and emotional problems without regard to 
their ability to pay the cost of such care—which 
often is expensive»(Clawson, 1965). This was «the first 
nationally negotiated psychiatric care insurance plan 
reached through the collective bargaining process» 
(Clawson, 1965). Some of the numerous corporations 
that agreed to pay the cost of mental health insurance 
for the employees and their families were Allis Chal­
mers, American Motors, Caterpillar, Chrysler, Ford, 
General Motors, International Harvester, and John 
Deere. One of the originators of this unusual propos­
al was Melvin Glasser, a former dean at Brandeis 
University, who said, «Mental health care is the 
greatest unmet health need of workers today» (Claw­
son, 1965). Naturally, unlike the American Medical 
Association, which opposed Medicare, the American 
Psychiatric Association supported and even helped 
formulate the United Auto Workers’ plan. In fact, 
Dr. Daniel Blain, the president of the psychiatric 
association, wrote to President Walter Reuther: «We 
have in these contracts, beyond a doubt, a real break­
through in putting the national struggle against men­
tal illness on a sound footing. I pledge the coopera­
tion of our association in making these new plans suc­
ceed» (Clawson, 1965).
When these changes are compared with family 
needs and social work in the less affluent develop­
ing countries of Africa and the rest of the Third 
World, as one would expect, we find that main em­
phasis is still being placed on purely economic prob­
lems, nutrition, hygiene, physical health, and the 
like. The tendency to deemphasize humiliating char­
ity and to train social workers in more modern tech­
niques is still somewhat rudimentary (Nérot and Mis-
ké, 1972; Iliovici, 1972; Sicault, 1972; cf. Skórzynski, 
1971; Heraud, 1970).
VII. New York’s needy families
So far, the above mentioned illustrations, which 
are primarily megascopic or macroanalytical, tend 
to support the theory concerning the inverse rela­
tionship between physiological and sociopsychologi­
cal human needs. It is now necessary to examine the 
theory through some microscopic or microanalyti- 
cal data.
One of the tests designed for this purpose was 
based on the changing needs of the families of a ma­
jor American city, namely, New York.
A. Methodology
The population of the study consisted of New 
York’s needy families that had been described in 
the New York Times during the month of December 
in each year. An example of such a case is given be­
low (New York Times, December 7, 1952, II, p. 3, 
Case 65):
«Fatally III
"Mrs. Dorothy R., 26, has a progressive nerve dis­
ease which is incurable and is expected soon to be 
fatal. She staggers when she walks and is losing the 
ability to grasp things with her hands. Her husband, 
Max, 27, a waiter, has been taking time off to help 
with the housework and the care of Celia, 4. But he 
is so alarmed about his wife and Celia, who suffers 
from allergies, that he has developed ulcers.
"He appealed to the agency recently because the 
family savings, used to supplement his curtailed earn­
ings, were exhausted. To make ends meet he had 
to resume full-time work and he could not afford 
outside help.
"Homemaker service, for which funds are urgent­
ly needed, will not be a permanent solution, but it 
will relieve the strain on the R.’s and allow them a 
breathing spell in which they can plan with the coun­
selor for Celia’s care and the time when Mr. R. will 
have to be both mother and father to her.»
In order to have a sufficiently long and economi­
cally heterogeneous period of time for the test of 
the theory, the chronological limits 1928 and 1952 
were selected. Moreover, two 12-year intervals were 
chosen, thus giving us the needy families described in 
1928, 1940, and 1952. For the sake of uniformity, the 
sample included the first December group of 100 
cases that appeared in the New York Times in each 
of these years. From the resulting group of 300 needy 
families, 150 cases were selected at random—50 
from each year—the final sample thus consisting
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of 50 items from 1928, 50 from 1940, and 50 from 
1952.
The content analysis that followed explored four 
aspects of these cases:
1. Family problems. This refers to the family cri­
ses that, as stated in the New York Times, generated 
the needs for which some form of assistance was 
solicited. Of course, in many cases two or more prob­
lems were mentioned.
2. Family needs. Again, this represents the spe­
cific needs presented in the New York Times as 
the reasons for which help was sought. Many fami­
lies were described as having two or more needs at 
the same time.
3. Presentation of cases. An effort was made to 
distinguish between «subjectively» and «objectively» 
presented cases. The former merely refers to more 
or less emotional descriptions that contained value 
judgments, strong adjectives, sentimental expressions, 
and the like. The latter means direct, straightforward, 
realistic, matter-of-fact statements of family prob­
lems and needs. To strengthen this classification, 
the writer supplemented his judgment with those of 
five judges, namely, a Catholic priest, a rabbi, a 
Protestant minister, and two graduate students, one 
in psychology and the other in sociology. Some dis­
agreement regarding this classification arose with 
reference to only seven cases. Additional discussion 
among the judges, however, revealed that their dis­
agreement was not substantial.
4. Religious affiliation of agencies. This variable 
was included in order to explore the possible rela­
tionship between the religious affiliation of the at­
testing agencies and the subjective or objective pres­
entation of their respective cases.
The above four variables were then employed to 
test the following four hypotheses for the period 
between 1928 and 1952:
1. Family problems are increasingly becoming 
sociop sychological.
2. Family needs are increasingly becoming socio- 
psychological.
3. Needy families are being increasingly described 
more objectively.
4. In the past, Catholic agencies tended to describe 
their cases more subjectively than non-Catholic 
agencies did.
B. Findings
Hypothesis 1. Family problems are increasingly 
becoming so ci op sychological.
Between 1928 and 1952, the distribution of family 
problems wa s as follows (the reader should remember 
that some families had more than one problem at
the same time, and that, since the sample contained 50 
cases from each year, the family percentages given 
are always twice as high as the corresponding absolute 
numbers of families that had the problems mentioned):
Problem 1928 % 1940% 1952%
Alcoholism 6 2 8
Business failure 0 6 4
Conflict in marriage 4 2 20
Death 14 16 16
Desertion 18 16 20
Homelessness 0 4 0
Illegitimacy 0 0 6
Mental illness 8 12 28
Neglect 6 0 2
Old age 32 22 18
Physical illness 80 74 64
Separation 0 4 2
Starvation 10 2 0
Suicide 2 0 2
Unemployment 4 10 2
These data, which are self-explanatory, support the 
hypothesis. Indeed, the problems presenting the most 
dramatic changes indicate that, for reasons already 
mentioned, sociopsychological family crises are 
becoming more common at the expense of physical 
ones.
Hypothesis 2. Family needs are increasingly be­
coming sociopsychological.
Also self-explanatory are the following figures, 
which reveal that our increasing affluence is grad­
ually leading to greater emphasis on sociopsychologi­
cal needs, thus corroborating the second hypothe­
sis:
Need 1928 % 1940 % 1952 %
Clothing 22 32 6
Food 76 42 2
Furniture 0 2 0
Guidance 0 14 82
Heat 0 4 0
Homemaking service 0 2 16
Institutionalization 0 0 4
Medical treatment 58 30 8
Psychiatric treatment 0 2 10
Shelter 20 30 10
Training 8 30 8
Miscellaneous 22 42 14
Hypothesis 3. Needy families are being increasingly
described more objectively.
The percentages of families presented subjectively 
or objectively by the attesting agencies have been 
changing consistently, with objectivity constantly 
gaining ground. Below are the relevant values:
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Description 1928 % 1940 % 1952 %
Subjective 100 52 0
Objective 0 48 100
Hypothesis 4. In the past, Catholic agencies tended 
to describe their cases more subjectively than non- 
Catholic agencies did.
The last hypothesis was also supported, since, as 
the following data suggest, although all attesting agen­
cies have become objective in this sphere, Catholic 
ones were more subjective in the past, the order 
from most subjective to most objective being Catho­
lic, nondenominational, and Jewish:
Religion 1928% 1940%
Subjective-Objective Subjective - Objective
Catholic 100 0 78.6 21.4
Jewish 100 0 15.4 84.6
Nondenominational 100 0 56.5 43.5
1952 %
Subjective-Objective
Catholic 0 100
Jewish 0 100
Nondenominational 0 100
VIII. summary and conclusion
The theory presented in this study is that, as science 
and technology advance and the resulting affluence 
generates higher levels of satisfaction for man’s 
physiological drives, our emphasis on sociopsycholog- 
ical needs becomes greater and greater. The data 
employed to test this theory were of two types: one, 
macroanalytical or historical, and two, microana- 
lytical or semihistorical, the latter being the prob­
lems and needs of New York’s «neediest» families. At 
least the data included here do support the theory.
The numerous implications of these findings are 
obvious. Below are a few of them:
1. We need a standardized and more precise and 
systematic nomenclature of human needs in order 
to study them more fruitfully.
2. Our increasing affluence necessitates further re­
search into the psychology and sociology of leisure 
time.
3. More meaningful education in this sector is also 
necessary.
4. We must explore the exact relationship between 
frustration and violence.
5. Social planning in these areas is something that 
can no longer be postponed with impunity.
6. The developing economies of the Third World 
will generate new sociopsychological needs which, 
unless appropriate measures are taken, may result 
in social unrest and even violence.
7. Finally, the utopian plans of those who conceive 
of purely economic solutions as sufficient panaceas 
are simplistic and ludicrous, as they reveal their 
advocates’ inability to understand the nature of 
both our physiological and sociopsychological needs. 
Unfortunately, although physical satiety is often 
easy to achieve, there is no answer, for instance, to 
this question: When does a man have enough power? 
For man’s sociopsychological needs are insatiable, 
boundless, unfathomable!
ADDENDUM
This theory may be called the kinetic - potential theory of 
human needs. The relationship is roughly approximated by the 
following formula:
PN + SPN = C
Here PN represents physical needs, SPN sociopsychological 
needs, and C a constant quantity of human needs.
The idea has been borrowed from physics, where Bernoulli’s 
principle states that, in a moving fluid, although kinetic and 
potential energy may change, their sum always remains the 
same.
REFERENCES
Berkowitz, Leonard
1969 «Social Motivation», Volume 3, pp. 50-135, in 
Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, editors, The 
Handbook of Social Psychology, second edition, 
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
Booz
1967 Family Service Association of America, New York. 
Brill, A.A., editor
1938 The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, New York: 
Modern Library.
Brooks, Harvey
1972 «The Uses of Knowledge», Science, 177 (August 4): 
386-387.
Brown, Judson S.
1968 «Acquired Drives», Volume 4, pp. 280-286, in 
David L. Sills, editor, International Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan.
Clawson, Ken.
1965 «Free Mental Health Care Included in Employee 
Benefits of UAW Pact», The Toledo Blade (July 
26): 13.
Deutsch, Albert
1949 The Mentally III in America, New York: Columbia 
University Press.
English, Horace, and Ava English
1965 A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and 
Psychoanalytical Terms, New York: McKay. 
Family Service Association of America
1968 Facts and Trends of FSAA Member Agencies, 
New York.
Fink, Arthur
1942 The Field of Social Work, New York: Holt. 
Friedlander, Walter A.
1961 Introduction to Social Welfare, second edition, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Fromm, Erich.
1955 The Sane Society, New York: Holt.
Greenblatt, Milton, et al., editors.
1957 The Patient and the Mental Hospital, Glencoe, 
Illinois: Free Press.
100
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 01:55:53 |
evolution of human needs in changing civilizations
Hamilton, Gordon.
1964 Theory and Practice of Social Case Work, second 
edition, New York: Columbia University Press.
Harris, Robert, and Alair A. Townsend.
1971 «Poverty», Volume 2, pp. 896-905, in Robert Mor­
ris, editor, Encyclopedia of Social Work, New 
York: National Association of Social Workers.
Heraud, Brian J.
1970 Sociology and Social Work, New York: Pergamon.
Holden, Constance.
1972 «Nader on Mental Health Centers», Science, 177 
(August 4): 413-415.
Hull, Clark L.
1943 Principles of Behavior, New York: Appleton.
Iliovici, Jean.
1972 «L’Apport Européen au Service Social du Tiers- 
Monde», Les Carnets de l’Enfance, 19 (July-Septem- 
ber): 103-111.
Kagan, Jerome, and Ernest Havemann.
1972 Psychology, New York: Harcourt.
Konopka, Gisela.
1963 Social Group Work, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall.
Krafft-Ebing, Richard von.
1965 Psychopathia Sexualis, New York: Putnam.
Margolis, Philip M., and Armando R. Favazza.
1971 «Mental Health and Illness», Volume 1, pp. 773-782, 
in Robert Morris, editor, Encyclopedia of Social 
Work, New York: National Association of Social 
Workers.
McClelland, David C., et al.
1953 The Achievement Motive, New York: Appleton.
Murray, H.
1938 Explorations in Personality, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Nérot, Solange, and Annick Miské.
1972 «Nouvelles Perspectives pour la Formation des 
Travailleurs Sociaux», Les Carnets de l’Enfance, 19 
(July-September): 74-81.
Orshansky, Mollie.
1965 «Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty 
Profile», Social Security Bulletin, 28 (January): 
3-29.
President’s Commission on Income Maintenance.
1969 Poverty amid Plenty—The American Paradox, 
Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office.
Richter, Curt P.
1943 «Total Self Regulatory Functions in Animal and 
Human Beings», Harvey Lectures, 38:63-103.
Riley, Matilda W., and Anne Foner.
1968 Aging and Society, New York: Russell Sage Foun­
dation, Volume 1.
Sicault, Georges.
1972 «Service Social et Développement», Les Carnets 
de l'Enfance, 19 (July-September): 115-124.
Sillamy, Norbert.
1967 Dictionnaire de la Psychologie, Paris: Larousse.
Skórzynski, Zygmunt.
1971 «Recherches sur la Dynamique des Schemas et des 
Modèles Sociaux des Vacances des Habitants des 
Villes en Pologne», Society and Leisure, 4 : 23-58.
Theodorson, George A., and Achilles G. Theodorson.
1969 Modem Dictionary of Sociology, New York: 
Crowell.
United States Bureau of the Census.
1971 Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1971, 
Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office.
Vernon, Glenn M.
1972 Human Interaction, New York: Ronald.
Woodworth, Robert S.
1918 Dynamic Psychology, New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press.
Young, Paul Thomas.
1968 «Physiological Drives», Volume 4, pp. 275-280, 
in David L. Sills, editor, International Encyclope­
dia of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan.
r
«Everything which undergoes a change is changed from that which is an entity in potentiality 
into that which is an entity in act.»
Aristotle, Metaphysics — 11.2.1069b 15-16
«Changes are four in number: either according to quiddity, or quality, or quantity, or to place 
where; simple generation and corruption according to quiddity; increase and diminution accord­
ing to quantity; alteration according to quality; motion according to place.»
Aristotle, Metaphysics — 11.2.1069b 9-13
From the Bekker edition of Aristotle’s works.
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